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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the discourse strategies used by former US President 
Donald Trump in the tweets in which he discusses the construction of the wall between 
the US and Mexico. Border walls play a very important role in today’s world in that they 
characterise discourses of exclusion and othering in geopolitical and cultural terms and 
indicate a revival of nationalism.  By employing Proximization Theory, this paper shows 
how certain lexico-grammatical features of Trump’s tweets contribute to a nationalist 
and populist discourse which legitimises the construction of the wall on the basis of the 
threat coming from an “Other”.   










As one of the defining issues of Donald Trump’s presidency, the proposed building of 
the wall between the United States of America and Mexico provoked controversy, and 
even scandal, at both a national and international level. While the proposal was 
allegedly intended to prevent criminals from crossing the US-Mexico border, the wall 
was soon being defined by many politicians and media pundits as a sign of Trump’s 
racism. Other statements by the former US Presidente.g., Mexico sending its “bad 
hombres”, i.e., rapists, murderers and thieves, to the United States, or his refusal to 
accept immigrants from “shithole countries”gave further impetus to these 
accusations. However, very little has been said on the kind of discourse strategies used 
by Trump to legitimise the need for the wall and, as a consequence, how the ideology 
of the exclusion of the “Other” was constructed and became popular among a sizeable 
share of the US electorate.  
This paper attempts to shed light on these issues by analysing a corpus of tweets 
containing the word “wall” from Trump’s Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump). The first 
section of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the role of border walls in today’s world 
and of their importance in characterising discourses of exclusion and othering. This is 
done by discussing the recent development of Border Studies, which have addressed 
the resurgence of border walls as indicative of a revival of nationalism. The second 
section discusses the paradigm of social media and its importance for populist 
communication and focuses on the role played by Twitter for Trump in his attempt to 
legitimise the construction of the wall. The third section discusses Cap’s Proximization 
Theory (PT) (2013, 2017) and its three constitutive aspects (spatial, temporal, axiological) 
in the light of Kopytowska’s MPA (Media Proximization Approach) (2020), which 
develops Cap’s PT in the context of the digital environment of social media. In the fourth 
section, the corpus of Trump’s tweets is analysed by delving into the discourse 
strategies identified by PT and used by Trump in his repeated calls to build the wall and 
provide security to American citizens. As discussed in the Conclusions, these strategies 
are employed by Trump to highlight the threat that the lack of a “strong” wall entails as 
well as the benefits that a wall would supposedly bring to the security of the nation. It 
will be argued that social media provide a very apt communication context in which 
Trump legitimised his proposal. 
 
 
THE GEOPOLITICAL AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDER WALLS  
 
Building a wall at the US-Mexico border allegedly to prevent the influx of criminals into 
the United States was one of the main proposals put forward by Donald Trump during 
his 2016 presidential campaign and would later come to define his presidency. This is 
certainly not the first wall between nations to be proposed or indeed be built, but the 
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observers) raises serious questions about the meaning and function of walls at three 
related levels: 1) in strictly institutional terms; 2) in, broadly speaking, cultural and 
political terms, and 3) as an important topos in nationalist and often racist discourses 
within the public sphere. 
Defining a border wall is not as straightforward as it may seem. According to a 
recent and all-encompassing definition, a “wall” in proximity of a border between 
nations refers to  
 
border infrastructure in the form of barriers/fences/walls: (1) whose foundations are fixed and 
of masonry (…), (2) that delineate part of the border outside regular points of entry and (3) 
whose official or unofficial functions are to assert a territorial border/claim and/or prevent the 
effective passage of persons and goods. (Vallet, State 8) 
 
This definition should somehow be complemented by the fact that the wall itself 
does not literally coincide with the border line between two nations, for it is usually built 
by one of them within its own territorial confines as a barrier designed to prevent or 
limit access from the other. For this reason, a wall is the expression of unequal relations 
of power as it is usually “unilateral and exclusive” (Vallet, State 9).  
Walls separating nations have been a frequent occurrence throughout history, but 
their number and length have been increasing at an unprecedented level in recent 
years. The proliferation of new walls in modern times started after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and accelerated during the financial crisis of 2007-8 (Vallet, State 9-12). We are 
seeing a redefinition of the meaning of borders as we know them: the growing 
materialization of borders, i.e., the tendency to build visible and, to use one of Trump’s 
favourite words, “strong” borders in the shape of walls and barriers instead of less 
obtrusive and more “porous” borders, is a response to the growing sense of fear and 
moral panic developing inside many nations, including the United States. Since the 
purported function of walls is that of protecting the nation, they are frequently used in 
nationalist and/or racist discourses to legitimise the exclusion of unwanted strangers 
such as migrants, refugees or terrorists, three categories often conflated in populist 
rhetoric. As a matter of fact, in Europe, the recent rise in the number of new walls being 
planned or built coincides with the growing success of right-wing parties and 
movements (Benedicto & Brunet 7-8), who often construct their nativist and racist 
ideology on the basis of fear of alleged threats to the integrity of the homeland and the 
security of its citizens, threats depicted in the political discourse as caused by outsiders.  
However, in reality, walls are more often built as a response to internal (real or 
exaggerated) demands for security than to actual dangers from outside the nation. 
Indeed, walls may tell us more about the will of the nation to control its own territory, 
citizens and the symbolic elements associated with them than about actually protecting 
the nation itself from outside enemies. There are many doubts about the effectiveness 
of walls, which, in this sense, have a “theatrical performative presence” (Minca and Rijke) 
and provide a sense of reassurance, as if a barrier guaranteed zero access to the nation 
which builds it. As argued by Vallet (Introduction 3), the decision to build a wall follows 
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protecting a nation is less important than its visual component and “perceived 
insecurity” (Vallet Introduction 3) in its public sphere. The construction of walls over the 
last twenty years or so has been viewed as a response by nation states to the waning 
power of nations over their territories caused by globalisation, in the context of a 
“globalized world [that] harbours fundamental tensions between opening and 
barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription” (Brown 7). Walls and barriers 
“restore spectacularly a semblance of control over transnational flows” (Deleixhe et al. 
642): they lead to a militarization of borders and act as visible, tangible artefacts which 
project a sense of security in the imaginary of the nation, without actually being totally 
effective instruments of protection. In fact, it may be said that the most important 
function of walls and fences is that of their being displayed as “facts on the ground”, 
that is, visible artifacts of a government’s will to put its authority and power on display, 
beyond their effectiveness in stopping the flow of unwanted strangers (Hassner and 
Wittenberg 165). 
Modern walls are not just a physical construction limiting movement between two 
nations (usually from one to the other but, given their allegedly defensive scope, rarely 
vice versa), they are also constructed and experienced symbolically and in discourse. 
Political borders are “crucially important symbolic spaces because the narratives that 
legitimise sovereign power are predicated on claiming tight linkages between the 
territory, the people, and the state” (Jones 25). This is particularly important for those 
nations which, under the impulse of nativist and nationalist parties and leaders, are 
planning to build, or are building, walls at their borders as part of “a sharpening of 
discursive distinctions between the people and places on the inside and the evil, 
dehumanized, and disorderly others who are kept out” (Jones 25). 
Besides its materialised and militarised nature, the border wall becomes the key 
element of a discursive topos around which the right-wing (and racist) concept of the 
nation is built, that is, “a limited and sovereign community that exists and persists 
through time and is tied to a specific territory (space), inherently and essentially 
constructed through an in/out (member/non-member) opposition and its out-groups” 
(Wodak 76-77). In the context of this scheme, the discursive representation of 
homogeneity within the in-group is constructed by glossing over internal differences 
and is termed in opposition to a similarly homogenous out-group, represented as 
threatening the nation. The distinction between “us” and “them” is the basis of an 
exclusionary rhetoric which legitimises the construction or the “strengthening” of new 
borders in order to contain the supposed danger coming from without. It is actually the 
walled border which serves the purpose, both visibly and discursively, of creating the 
Other, institutionalising difference and exclusion. This exclusionary rhetoric, which 
leads to the normalization of exclusion in discourse (Wodak 84), is part of Wodak’s own 
Discourse-Historical Approach, which has been used to explain Trump’s wall rhetoric. 
According to Demata (Wall), the construction of the Trump Wall answers the need for 
security and is central in the discursive construction of the topos of threat or danger, one 
of the most frequently used topoi in Wodak’s own argumentation scheme (Wodak 52-
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legitimation strategies used in political and media discourse, and this has become true 
both in many European nations and in the United States. 
 
 
TRUMP AND TWITTER: A SHORTHAND FOR POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 
As is widely known, Twitter was Donald Trump’s media of preference. A compulsive 
Twitter user, “the Twitter President,” as Trump was often known as, used the 
microblogging platform to set his political agenda and communicate directly to his 
electorate (as of September 2020, he had 85,8 million followers).1 Twitter certainly 
helped Trump orchestrate his own “media spectacle”, that is, media events that disrupt 
the ordinary flow of events and lure the mass audience into following them (Kellner). 
Indeed, because of its affordances and modes of use, Twitter was well suited to 
spreading Trump’s simple and emotionally charged messages. Like other social media 
such as Facebook and Instagram, Twitter is playing an increasingly important role in 
social and political communication. This is mainly due to the accessibility of social media 
and their pervasive presence in daily communication. Their interactive nature promotes 
the exchange of information and erodes the hierarchy of traditional mass media 
(Herring), in turn fostering larger citizen participation and, crucially, enabling political 
actors to access citizens’ daily lives much more easily than, for example, TV. Twitter, in 
particular, has become the means by which populist leaders can develop their form of 
“techno-plebiscitarianism” (Krämer 1299) whereby, behind the apparent inclusiveness 
and reciprocity typical of the microblogging platform, they can build consensus by 
inviting the community to share, like or retweet their stances.  
The semiotic and technical affordances of Twitter are the perfect breeding ground 
for populists: as argued by KhosraviNik, “The fact remains that given the nature of 
populism as a style of communication, the new digital participatory technology is an 
apt space for construction, promotion and dissemination of such politics” (KhosraviNik 
435-36). The suitability of social media for populist politics, especially in its nationalist 
dimension, can be seen in the users’ many-to-many, horizontal participation (or the 
semblance of it), which constitutes a surrogate public sphere, in which online popularity 
(e.g., through the number of “likes”) is used as a proxy for consensus. Furthermore, social 
media foster affective communication between users, something that suits populist 
style and appeal to emotions. Indeed, Twitter itself is characterised by simplicity, 
impulsivity and incivility (Ott), all features which became typical of Trump’s use of social 
media, and the demand for short messages with a strong affective dimension pre-empts 
any possibility for reasoned analysis to improve the quality of debate in the public 
 
1 The real number of followers of Trump’s official Twitter page, @realDonaldTrump, was much 
smaller. According to sparktoro.com, an online resource which measures the composition of an audience 
on Twitter, 70,2% of Trump’s followers, or little more than 60 million, were “fake followers”, i.e., “accounts 
that are unreachable and will not see the account’s tweets (either because they’re spam, bots, 
propaganda, etc. or because they’re no longer active on Twitter)” (sparktoro.com 2020). Following the 
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sphere. The activities of public personalities on Twitter show that the potentially 
interactive features of the microblogging service are not conducive to public 
conversations but instead lead to “calls to action” directed to their followers, making 
use of imperatives with a much greater frequency than ordinary users (Page). In modern 
political communication as well as in business, simplicity is velocity, and Twitter, with its 
user-friendly features and limit in the number of characters allowed for each single 
“tweet”,2 is constructed to be simple in the formulation of messages as well as fast in its 
delivery. In the context of the increasing personalisation of politics at the expense of 
party politics taking place in social media (Pain and Chen), Twitter makes it possible to 
construct online identities.  
Twitter has become the digital space where authenticity is performed by the 
populist leader and “a fertile ground for self-presentation and profile-editing or digital 
embodiment” (Kissas 272). In his tweets, Trump managed to build a “defiant Twitter 
persona” (Kissas 270), constantly attacking opponents of all kinds and rarely engaging 
with traditional or mainstream politics. This aspect was shaped by Trump’s own 
performance on Twitter: most of his tweets were written by him personally, using a 
colloquial, first-person singular narrative style and a very direct and spontaneous 
linguistic register (Enli; Demata, Twitter). His colloquial and conversational style 
communicated the impression of authenticity and emotional proximity to his 
supporters. Trump therefore constructed an apparently unmediated relationship 
between the populist leader and the (or his) “people.” Thus, he always showed his 
persona in a straightforward, direct and unmediated way: he wrote emotionally 
charged, violent, often racist, messages, and employed a confrontational style, with 
personal insults and attacks on his adversaries (Pain and Chen). Not surprisingly, then, 
Twitter was also used by Trump to legitimise some of his proposals, including the 
construction of the wall. As argued by Rivers and Ross, Trump’s personal authority as 
emerging in his tweets went above and beyond that legally bestowed by the office of 
the President as the legitimation of the construction of the wall is based on his own 
personal authority, emotional commitment and evidence-less claims (Rivers and Ross). 
 
 
METHODOLOGY: PROXIMIZATION THEORY AND MEDIA PROXIMIZATION 
APPROACH 
 
On Twitter and elsewhere, the topic of the wall was discussed by Trump in connection 
with border security, crime and migration. Racist, nationalist and nativist discourses on 
migration have become very common in the current climate of populist politics and 
have increasingly been the focus of research in Critical Discourse Analysis. Among the 
various approaches used to analyse Trump’s populist nationalist discourse, Piotr Cap’s 
Proximization Theory (PT) and Monika Kopytowska’s Media Proximization Approach 
 
2 Until 2017, the maximum number of characters of tweets was 140. Since 2017, the maximum 
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(MPA) have been chosen for this paper because they offer very effective analytical tools 
to account for Trump’s legitimising strategies for his highly contentious proposal of a 
border wall in the context of the affective communication of social media.  
According to PT, legitimation for certain political actions is justified by the way 
certain threats are represented as looming over a Discourse Space (DS) and generate 
fear. Proximixation is “a discourse strategy of presenting the apparently remote events 
and ideologies as increasingly consequential to the speaker and her addressee” (Cap, 
Language 15). It is a construction of a conceptual opposition between a home-group 
and a remote group, or Other. Through proximization, the external threat is given 
negative attributes and is represented in discourse as encroaching upon “our” space, or 
what Chilton (2004) calls the deictic centre, a spatial dimension inhabited by “us” and 
outside of which lies a threat. The Otheror the “outside-deictic-centre” entities 
(ODCs)is represented discursively as a threatening presence moving towards “us”, the 
central entities, or “inside-the-deictic-centre” entities (IDCs), represented spatially as the 
centre. The Other is often represented as a foreign group, capable of a wide range of 
dangerous acts, and can range from a foreign army or illegitimate warring group 
threatening the nation to migrants crossing the nation’s borders or landing on its 
shores. Proximization is ultimately employed by those in power to invoke and justify 
specific actions and policies in response to the threatening Other and as part of what 
Cap calls “interventionist discourse”, that is,  
 
a state governance discourse whose function is to sanction and enact policies aimed at 
neutralizing, whether legislatively or by force, often military force, external threats to the 
society or a socio-political group (including the global international community) which the 
political actor/speaker represents (or aspires to represent) and rules over or otherwise “leads” 
(or usurps a moral right to do so). (Cap, Proximization 66) 
 
In its construction of an external (real, exaggerated or imaginary) threat, 
interventionist discourse relies on proximization and engages with the threat by 
employing a set of lexical and deictic strategies. Cap identifies three dimensions of PT 
through which it is possible to categorise the lexical elements construing proximization: 
1) Spatial proximization includes all those discursive elements which conceptualise the 
threatening “arrival” of the ODCs and their movement toward the centre in physical, 
even geographical terms. The impact of the ODCs is represented as inevitable and 
potentially tragic, unless immediate action is taken; 2) Temporal proximization 
emphasises the temporal closeness of the threat and, often, its projection in a historical 
dimension through comparison with other past events and possible events or 
consequences in the future. Having the present as its central axis, temporal 
proximization requires certain linguistic instruments conflating the actual events of the 
past and the likely ones in the future. 3) Axiological proximization constructs the clash 












a forced construal of a gathering ideological conflict between the “home values” of the DS 
central entities, IDCs, and the “alien”, antagonistic values of the ODCs, which occupy the 
conceptual periphery of the DS. The IDC-ODC conflict either will, or (at least) may, lead to a 
physical clash, that is the materialization of the ODC ideological threat within the IDC space. 
(Cap, Proximization 94). 
 
These three dimensions are made evident in discourse through specific deictic 
expressions and lexico-grammatical choices that speakers use to communicate the 
distance between us/here/good and them/there/evil. Crucially, in a text or a corpus of 
texts identified for analysis these three dimensions may not be lexicalised in equal 
measure, and the degree to which each dimension is represented depends on how the 
discourse develops and on the type of demands made on the speaker by the particular 
circumstances and context. Furthermore, these three dimensions may also overlap, in 
that, for example, lexical elements denoting spatial proximization may also contain 
certain time markers (e.g., different verb tenses) which may act as elements of temporal 
proximization. The combination of all these elements visualises the imminent clash 
between ODCs and IDCs and its possible effects on the Deictic Centre, thus providing 
the fear appeal which is used to legitimise preventive measures to protect “our space” 
and to, as Trump would say in his trademark slogan, “Make America Great Again.” 
Cap’s PT accounts for the way distance reduction of certain legitimising (and de-
legitimising) discourses takes place mainly through language. However, the 
legitimation strategies used by the populist nationalist discourse gain a distinctive 
salience in the context the new media environment, and especially in social media. 
According to Kopytowska’s Media Proximization Approach (MPA) (2020), the 
technological affordances of social media play a very important role in manipulating the 
way the distance from the self is perceived in political communication. Distance 
reduction is part and parcel of the process itself of the new globalised, user-generated 
forms of mediatization which populism exploits. A higher capacity to be persuasive on 
the basis of new (i.e., reduced) distance dynamics results in the “salience enhancement” 
of certain issues: social media remove spatio-temporal boundaries and, by aligning like-
minded users through algorithms, enhances affective communication as well as 
extreme polarization between in-groups and out-groups, or “us” and “them”. In this 
context, the discourse strategies identified by PT need to be analysed by taking into 
account a new kind of textuality, one which differs from traditional forms of political 
discourse in that it manages to establish a more direct channel of communication. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The corpus of tweets analysed in this paper includes all of Trump’s tweets in which the 
word “wall” is mentioned. The tweets were downloaded from TrumpTwitterArchive 
.com, a searchable database containing all the tweets published in Trump’s official 
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irrelevant results (e.g., “Wall Street Journal” or “paywall”) and was analysed first 
manually and then, once the most important lexical features were identified by the 
author, using Wordsmith Tools (Scott). The final corpus includes the texts of 382 tweets 
discussing the US-Mexico border wall, starting from 5 August 2014, when Trump first 
tweeted about the wall (“SECURE THE BORDER! BUILD A WALL!”), to 19 August 2020. The 
corpus of 382 tweets contains 13971 tokens and 2238 types, or distinct words.  
PT faces certain methodological challenges when employed to analyse tweets 
and their unique discursive features. As discussed above, tweets are very short 
messages (e.g., slogans) and, unlike speeches, cannot contain lengthy texts with 
complex discursive structures. Consequently, a single tweet rarely contains a high 
number of lexical elements expressing proximization, which typically requires longer 
stretches of language than just those elements which can be formulated in up to 280 
characters. Speeches or corpora containing longer texts do not have these problems. 
For example, in his analysis of the White House corpus, Cap (2013) takes into account 
only those lexical items whose total number reaches the 0.1% threshold. This principle 
could not be followed here, as Trump often mentions the wall not just to discuss the 
wall in and of itself, but also, for example, to endorse candidates for Senate, Congress or 
State legislatures who support building the wall. For this reason, PT had to be slightly 
adapted to the uniqueness of the corpus in question by employing some 
complementary analytical tools to more completely account for the centrality of the 
wall in Trump’s discourse. Indeed, PT can only be used and understood if seen in the 
context of MPA, which accounts for the “salience enhancement” of certain issues by 
considering the distance reduction which is implicit in the design of social media and 
which shapes the structure of discourse. MPA can also be used in the context of the mix 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches chosen for this paper, as the cumulative 
effect of discourse in legitimising certain political measures (Fairclough) can be assessed 
by looking at the pervasiveness of certain choices in discourse over long periods of time.  
The analysis of Trump’s tweets highlights the frequent occurrence of lexical items 
defining the spatial proximization framework. Specifically, as shown in the findings 
(Table 1), there is a wide range of ODCs, that is, those elements constructed outside the 
deictic centre of the DS.  
 
 
CATEGORY KEY ITEMS 
1. (NOUN PHRASES (NPS) CONSTRUED AS ELEMENTS OF 




2. (NPS CONSTRUED AS ELEMENTS OUTSIDE THE DEICTIC 





[‘We’]; [‘the (great) people of our country’]; [‘our 
country’]; [‘USA’, ‘United States of America’, 
‘America’’]; [‘a strong military’]; [‘our jobs 
economy and our safety’] 
 
[‘ISIS’]; [’13 Syrian refugees’, ‘Eight Syrians’]; 
[‘cartels and terrorists’]; [‘enemy combatants’]; 
[‘illegals’, ‘illegal aliens’, ‘illegal immigrants’] [’42 
million Latin Americans’]; [’tremendous numbers 
of people’] [‘criminals’, ‘dangerous criminals’, 
















3. (VERB PHRASES (VPS) OF MOTION AND DIRECTIONALITY 
CONSTRUED AS MARKERS OF MOVEMENT OF ODCS 
TOWARDS THE DEICTIC CENTRE) 
 
 
4. (VPS OF ACTION CONSTRUED AS MARKERS OF IMPACT 
OF ODCS UPON IDCS 
 
5. (NPS DENOTING ABSTRACT CONCEPTS CONSTRUED AS 
ANTICIPATIONS OF IMPACT OF ODCS UPON IDCS) 
 
6. (NPS DENOTING ABSTRACT CONCEPTS CONSTRUED AS 
EFFECTS OF IMPACT OF ODCS UPON IDCS) 
people)]; [‘drugs’, ‘drug flow’, ‘big drug and 
people flows’, ‘massive inflow of drugs’, ‘heroin 
and other drugs’]; [drugs (poison) and enemy 
combatants’]; [‘people and drugs’]; [Drugs Human 
Traffickers & Criminals of all shapes and sizes’, 
‘Crime Human Trafficking Gangs and Drugs’, 
‘Human trafficking gang members and criminals’, 
‘Gangs Drugs and Crime’, ‘drugs criminals 
(including human traffickers) and illegals’] 
 
[‘come/are coming into’/’trying to come into’]; 
[‘crossing[s]’]; [‘can enter’]; [‘marching’]; [‘headed 
our way’]; [‘flow/(are) flowing into’]; [‘pour/(are) 
pouring into’]; [are heading here’]; [‘(is) being 
invaded’] 
[‘committing crimes’]; [‘this tragic murder has 
taken place’] 
 
[‘threat’ ]; [‘danger’ ‘Big danger’’] [‘dangerous’]; 




Table 1. Key lexico-grammatical items of the spatial proximization framework 
 
 
There are three main classes of ODCs used to define the threat to the Deictic 
Centre: 1) terrorists, or potential terrorists, such as those individuals coming from Syria 
or groups affiliated with ISIS; 2) immigrants, often pre-modified by illegal; and 3) 
criminals of all kinds, in particular those related to drugs and human trafficking. These 
groups are often characterised by overlexicalization, as in, for example, Drugs Human 
Traffickers & Criminals of all shapes and sizes and Human trafficking gang members and 
criminals. All ODCs are human, except drugs/drug flow/massive inflow of drugs, or, on a 
few occasions, phrases made up of a mixture of human and non-human agents, e.g., big 
drug and people flows, drugs (poison) and enemy combatants’, people and drugs. The ODC 
elements change in the corpus depending on the context and the circumstances 
leading Trump to tweet. For example, the so-called Caravan, i.e., the groups of people 
who were slowly moving towards the US-Mexico border in January 2019, are only 
featured in Trump’s tweets from 15 to 31 January 2019 and then completely disappear. 
All the diverse ODC elements mentioned in Trump’s tweets are somehow aligned in his 
discourse because of their common movement towards the Deictic Centre as part of 
proximization and because of the common measure which, according to Trump, should 
be taken against their movement, i.e., the construction of the wall. Indeed, all the lexical 
elements constituting spatial proximization aim at communicating a sense of moral 
panic which makes the building of the wall an absolute necessity and constitutes an 
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Some of the lexical items expressing category 3, i.e., verb phrases of motion and 
directionality denoting the movement of ODCs towards the deictic centre, point to a 
metaphorization of the outside threat. Flow/flowing and pour/pouring into liken 
migrants and other ODCs to a dangerous liquid that threatens to burst the nation-
container’s seams. The use of the flood or liquid metaphor, in which the nation acts as a 
“container” and the outside elements are potentially disruptive fluids, is well-
established in racist discourse (Charteris-Black; Musolff). Another metaphor is 
constituted by the use of marching and invaded, which recall a military discourse 
through which the arrival of the Other (migrants) is compared to an army threatening 
the Deictic Centre (Santa Ana 260; Musolff). Both metaphors reinforce the sense of fear 
which permeates Trump’s discourse and which the wall is supposed to contain. 
The technical limitations of the messages posted on Twitter demand 
condensation in both length and content. Accordingly, the construction of extended 
accounts expressing elements of spatial, temporal and axiological proximization related 
to the threat of the ODCs rarely occurs in the same tweet. The narrative construed 
around Trump’s wall discourse is dispersed over many tweets, which encapsulate either 
the need to prevent certain social actors from reaching the Deictic Centre or the urgent 
need for the wall. There are a few exceptions, such as some mini-narratives constituted 
by single tweets, each of which containing elements of proximization: 
 
The fight against ISIS starts at our border. ‘At least’ 10 ISIS have been caught crossing the 
Mexico border. Build a wall! (8 October 2014) 
ISIS is operating a training camp 8 miles outside our Southern border http://t.co/P8arBncO0A 
We need a wall. Deduct costs from Mexico! (17 April 2015)  
Again illegal immigrant is charged with the fatal bludgeoning of a wonderful and loved 64 year 
old woman. Get them out and build a WALL! (10 August 2015) 
The Kate Steinle killer came back and back over the weakly protected Obama border always 
committing crimes and being violent and yet this info was not used in court. His exoneration is 
a complete travesty of justice. BUILD THE WALL! (12 January 2017) 
 
The above mini-narratives constitute coherent wholes and reiterate the same 
points with the prospect of an imminent danger based on past events (the illegal 
immigrants charged with crimes or the “10 ISIS… caught crossing the Mexico border”), 
whose authors come from outside the Deictic Centre or are threatening to do so (as in 
the training camp of ISIS). A fuller and more organic narrative occurs in January 2019, 
when the Caravan of hundreds of migrants from Central America was approaching the 
US-Mexico borders (Phillips). Trump responded with a series of tweets outlining the 
imminent threat:  
 
A big new Caravan is heading up to our Southern Border from Honduras. Tell Nancy and Chuck 
that a drone flying around will not stop them. Only a Wall will work. Only a Wall or Steel Barrier 
will keep our Country safe! Stop playing political games and end the Shutdown! (15 January 
2019) 
Mexico is doing NOTHING to stop the Caravan which is now fully formed and heading to the 
United States. We stopped the last two - many are still in Mexico but can’t get through our Wall 
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Four people in Nevada viciously robbed and killed by an illegal immigrant who should not have 
been in our Country. 26 people killed on the Border in a drug and gang related fight. Two large 
Caravans from Honduras broke into Mexico and are headed our way. We need a powerful Wall! 
(21 January 2019) 
We have turned away at great expense two major Caravans but a big one has now formed and 
is coming. At least 8000 people! If we had a powerful Wall they wouldn’t even try to make the 
long and dangerous journey. Build the Wall and Crime will Fall! (26 January 2019) 
More troops being sent to the Southern Border to stop the attempted Invasion of Illegals 
through large Caravans into our Country. We have stopped the previous Caravans and we will 
stop these also. With a Wall it would be soooo much easier and less expensive. Being Built! (31 
January 2019) 
 
The temporal proximity of the ODCs is construed along a timeline construed in 
three phases: past events of a similar nature, imminent danger, and the need to build 
the wall to prevent the current danger (Table 2).  
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In this last set of mini-narratives, temporal continuity is used to advocate pre-
emptive policies to avoid the apparent inevitability of the clash and the impending 
physical threat that the members of the ODCs pose to the IDCs. The need to build the 
wall arises from (and is justified by) the memory of those ODCs who caused certain past 
events and the imminent arrival of people belonging to the same categories, namely 
immigrants belonging to the Caravan and murderers, two separate categories which 
are somehow conflated in Trump’s discourse. The spatio-temporal proximization 
strategies used in these mini-narratives, consisting of proximization of near history and 
imminent future threat perpetrated by ODCs approaching the Deictic Centre, suggest 
the direct physical threat that the United States is facing – hence the necessity of a wall.  
Conversely, the danger of “open borders” which, according to Trump, are 
supported by Democrats, is also used as an element of proximization. The lack of a wall 
brings crime and drugs to the United States, and Democrats are continually associated 
with open borders, thus implicitly blaming them for the threats to the Deictic Centre 
brought by elements of the ODCs. 
 
We will stop heroin and other drugs from coming into New Hampshire from our open southern 
border. We will build a WALL and have security. (9 February 2016) 
“Border Patrol Agents want the Wall.” Democrat’s [sic] say they don’t want the Wall (even 
though they know it is really needed) and they don’t want ICE. They don’t have much to 
campaign on do they? An Open Southern Border and the large-scale crime that comes with 
such stupidity! (27 December 2018) 
I look forward to VETOING the just passed Democrat inspired Resolution which would OPEN 
BORDERS while increasing Crime Drugs and Trafficking in our Country. I thank all of the Strong 
Republicans who voted to support Border Security and our desperately needed WALL! (14 
March 2019)  
Too bad the Dems in Congress won’t do anything at all about Border Security. They want Open 
Borders which means crime. But we are getting it done including building the Wall! More 
people than ever before are coming because the USA Economy is so good the best in history. 
(26 June 2019) 
Wall is moving fast in Texas Arizona New Mexico and California. Great numbers at the Southern 
Border. Dems want people to just flow in. They want very dangerous open Borders! 
https://t.co/gGuYzpTa9t (6 July 2020) 
Democrats want Open Borders and Crime! So dangerous for our Country. But we are building 
a big beautiful NEW Wall! I will protect America the Dems don’t know where to start! 
https://t.co/D0APaAxvVm (19 August 2019) 
 
In the examples above, Trump highlights the importance that a wall would have 
in reducing crime and drugs in general, without mentioning any specific human actor. 
Open borders are linked to the dangers that may be brought to the IDCs in the US by 
certain large categories (crime and drugs) which are dangerous and are therefore 
constructed as elements of axiological proximization. The sense of moral urgency and 
threat turns these tangible, physical threats into ideological ones, as the ODCs threaten 
the social fabric of the United States and therefore need to be stopped physically and 
visibly. In this sense, Trump’s wall rhetoric and the mention of drugs and crime index 
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“war on drugs”. Trump’s discourse is in line with political state discourse, which is usually 
characterised by dichotomous representations of the ideologically negative values of 
the ODCs and the positive values of the IDCs. An example is the war discourse of George 
W. Bush, whose rhetoric consisted in the construction of an external threat (terrorists) in 
opposition to a set of values (freedom, peace, justice, progress) embodied and 
supported by the citizens and leaders of the US, a construction which has been 
interpreted through PT (Cap, Proximization; Cap, Language 20-27). In Trump’s tweets, 
the wall is used as a powerful physical artefact as well as a symbolic barrier against non-
Americans which enables a physical opposition to the Other, but Trump does so without 
providing a set of signifiers clearly expressing the values of the IDCs. The need for the 
wall, expressed by deontic modality in modal verbs and imperatives, arises exclusively 
from the purported need for physical security and lacks extensive ideological 
motivations. Indeed, none of the words which typically appear as ideological signposts 
of American values (e.g., the aforementioned freedom, peace, justice, progress) appears 
in the corpus under examination. In most tweets, Trump simply stresses the need to 
build the wall or reports on its progress, and the mere mention of the wall in the tweets 
recalls the salience of the threat of the Other routinely evoked over the last few years 
both in Trump’s tweets and his in many speeches, interviews, and public statements on 
the topic.  
Trump’s tweets about the wall and the proximization strategies he employs in 
them prove that the textual limitations of tweets in terms of length constitute an asset 
for populist politics: tweets can encapsulate short and emotionally charged messages 
which play well in the polarised politics of populism and its highly affective and 
simplified communication. The large number of human actors defining the ODCs and 
their presence in condensed messages makes their presence salient and their threat 
cognitively accessible. Trump’s wall campaign makes the proximity of the physical 
threat of the Other even more tangible by employing the participatory, unmediated and 





From the analysis of Trump’s tweets it emerges that the materialization and 
militarization of borders, communicated by the notion itself of the wall, is circulated and 
legitimised in public discourses through strategies of proximization, which are central 
in Trump’s “interventionist discourse”. Trump identifies certain social agents outside the 
Deictic Centre, which is constituted by the United States of America, and portrays these 
agents as a physical threat moving towards (and threatening) this centre. The wall is 
central in establishing Trump’s spatial proximization, as it projects the material 
importance of a spatial delimitation preventing the movements of these outside 
entities towards the nation. The use of Twitter further increases the polarization and 
simplification of the political space as it accrues the “logic of perception” without any 
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In this sense, Trump’s plan to build a wall was not just based on the (supposedly 
urgent) need for security and protection: the Trump Wall is part of a wider agenda which 
responds to fears stemming from globalisation and which uses nationalism as the 
ideological backdrop for discursively constructing the need for the wall. The progressive 
shift from a “globalised” world with open (or no) borders to one in which the new 
populist politics has led to a new rise of nationalism and nativism has found its 
geopolitical catalyst in the planning or construction of new border walls and in the 
tightening of border security. The creation of an “othering” discourse, in which the 
political, linguistic and visual distance between “us” and “them”, is summed up in the 
material presence of the wall itself: the prevalence of lexical items related to spatial 
proximity derives from the fact that, at the cognitive level, the tangible and physical 
nature of Trump’s border wall is predominant. Indeed, besides their questionable 
effectiveness, walls communicate a sense of a security for a (supposedly) endangered 
homeland to its citizens by being a visible, physical barrier, in an ostentatious show of 
protecting the “insiders” from the threatening Other. Crucially, this new “border 
regime”, based on walls or other seemingly impenetrable barriers allegedly aiming to 
exclude unwanted foreigners, supports a sense of national cohesion and unity which is 
based on the aspirations of uniformity and sameness in terms of identity. This aspiration 
consists in the continuous reassurance provided by “walling” in terms of both the 
narrative of security and the narrative of the nation (Jones 24-25), as the projected need 
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